the third pillar. However, while controls on external borders, asylum, immigration and judicial cooperation on civil matters were transferred to the first pillar, police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters remained in the third pillar (Kaunert et al. 2014 ).
On 1 December 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force. The Treaty formally abolished the EU's three-pillar structure, which has had the effect of simplifying the decision-making procedure in the AFSJ. While the 'communautarisation' of criminal justice and policing matters has increased, the inclusion of provisions establishing 'emergency brakes' and 'accelerators' means that it is not fully complete (Kaunert 2010) . The EU's objectives for each policy dimension of the AFSJ are set out in Title V of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) ('Area of Freedom, Security and Justice') (Kaunert et al. 2014) .
Academic approaches to the study of the AFSJ and EU police and judicial cooperation
The AFSJ has received increasing scholarly attention due to its rapid growth in recent years (Walker 2004; Peers 2006 Peers , 2012 . Many scholars have claimed that developments in the AFSJ have been driven primarily by concerns about security, rather than freedom and justice, which has led to the adoption by the EU of a range of new policies and instruments relating to police and judicial cooperation (Baldaccini et al. 2007; Balzacq and Carrera 2006; Huysmans 2006; Guild and Geyer 2008; van Munster 2009; Bigo et al. 2010; Kaunert et al. 2014) . Concepts and analytical frameworks from Security Studies have been used to examine the development of the EU's approach to its internal security, including 'homeland security' and 'comprehensive security' (Kaunert and Zwolski 2013; Rozée 2013) . Other academic work has focused on the links between the internal and external dimensions of EU security, in particular highlighting the ways in which the EU has aimed to influence the internal security policies of neighbouring states (Balzacq 2009; Trauner and Carrapiço 2012; Rozée 2015) . Within the literature on EU police and judicial cooperation, increasing attention has been given to the EU's counter-terrorism policy (Spence 2007; Eckes 2009; Bures 2011; Argomaniz 2011; Kaunert and Léonard 2011; Bossong 2012; MacKenzie et al. 2013; de Londras and Doody 2015) .
Other academic contributions can be seen as contributing to the classical debate over the nature of EU integration, between theories that emphasise supranational institutions and those that portray the EU as intergovernmental and dominated by the interests of nations. Neo-functionalism describes European integration as 'the process whereby actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new cent[re], whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states' (Haas 1958: 16) . According to this view, the 'loyalty' of citizens in a given community can shift towards a new political entity, in particular towards supranational organisations, such as the European Commission (Rosamond 2000: 65-68; Kaunert et al. 2012: 6) . At the opposite end of the spectrum are those scholars who emphasise the role of national interests in driving the process of European integration and view the EU primarily as an intergovernmental organisation. Moravcsik (1998 Moravcsik ( , 1999 has argued that national leaders make decisions in response to constraints and opportunities derived from the economic interests of powerful domestic constituents, as well as the relative power of each state in the international system (Kaunert et al. 2012: 6) . From this perspective, the purpose of international institutions is to bolster the credibility of interstate commitments (Moravcsik 1998) .
Supranational institutions, such as the European Commission, are not considered to have significant independent powers in their own right, but are rather viewed as facilitators of the collective will of national governments (Nugent 2006: 553) .
This debate over the nature of EU integration has informed the analysis of the EU's security activities and of the development of police and judicial cooperation. It can notably be seen in the scholarly literature on the roles of different actors in the development of the AFSJ, including police and judicial cooperation. From an intergovernmentalist perspective, the process of European integration is dominated by national leaders and national interests, meaning that EU integration occurs because of a change in interests within the Member States or as the result of a grand political bargain (Moravcsik 1998: 18) . While the Member States have a central place in the EU policy-making process, several scholars have criticised the fact that Moravcsik's intergovernmentalist view 'assumes national interests to be exogenous of the EU process' (Wincott 1995: 602) . Member States continuously interact within the EU system, and national interests and preferences may be shaped by different norms and values (Christiansen 2002 (Christiansen , 2008 Christiansen and Reh 2009; Kaunert 2012: 34) . In addition, these norms may change over time (Finnemore 1996a (Finnemore , 1996b Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) . Kaunert (2012: 34-35) describes the construction of norms as occurring in several stages. First, actors provide reasons for action. In competition with each other, actors push for their reasons for action to be accepted as a norm.
Following this, the norm socialisation stage occurs; a norm will then eventually become the dominant norm. The concept of norms is highly useful for understanding the process of EU policy-making. While national sovereignty remains the prevailing norm in the international system, within the EU, this norm is in constant competition with the norm to pool sovereignty at the EU level and thereby move the process of European integration forward.
Actors in EU police and judicial cooperation policy-making
Under the Treaty of Lisbon, EU police and judicial cooperation measures are adopted according to the ordinary legislative procedure, which has replaced the co-decision procedure. A feature specific to police and judicial cooperation matters is that the Commission shares its power of legislative initiative with the Member States, provided that they represent a quarter of the members of the Council (Article 76 TFEU). The European Parliament is consulted on operational cooperation measures, which are adopted unanimously by the Council. It is also possible for nine or more Member States to work together on the basis of 'enhanced cooperation' if the Council does not reach unanimity; in such cases, the European Council suspends the process in order to seek consensus ('emergency brake' mechanism under Article 87(3) TFEU). Kaunert (2012: 43) argues that supranational institutions have played a significant role in advancing AFSJ policies. In particular, the European Commission can be viewed as a 'supranational policy entrepreneur'. In other words, it has acted 'to initiate and push for a process of normative change regarding national sovereignty in the ASFJ among EU decision-makers, as well as concrete institutional change' (Kaunert 2012: 35) Commission at the European Convention (Kaunert 2012: 38-39) . Going back to the scholarly literature on policy entrepreneurship, Kingdon (1984) suggests that, in a close-knit policy community, a policy entrepreneur can shape the way in which problems are defined. Against this backdrop, Kaunert (2012: 38) argues that commonly held beliefs influence people's ideas and behaviours, and that participants in a policy community interact with each other and are socialised according to the norms that are prevalent in this reference group. In other words, social norms can influence the behaviour of people in a given policy community. It can therefore be concluded that the European Commission has acted as a significant supranational policy entrepreneur in driving forward European integration in the ASFJ.
While it can be argued that institutions matter to the process of European integration in the AFSJ, Member States and their governments also remain of central importance. This can be clearly seen in the ratification stage of any EU treaty, where Member States are 'the only game in town' (Kaunert 2012: 44) . The case of the Constitutional Treaty aptly illustrates this point. France and the Netherlands rejected this treaty in referenda, whilst the British government subsequently froze its ratification. Furthermore, French President Sarkozy and German Chancellor Merkel were key actors in the subsequent Lisbon Treaty renegotiations, whilst the Irish voted twice before the Lisbon Treaty could be ratified (Kaunert 2012: 44) .
Issues and activities in EU police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters
The remainder of this chapter explores developments in EU police and judicial The cornerstone of EU judicial cooperation is the principle of the mutual recognition of judicial decisions. This means that each national judicial authority must recognise decisions made by the judicial authority of another EU country with a minimum of formalities and with very few exceptions. The adoption of this principle has enabled the development of judicial cooperation without first harmonising criminal law across the EU, which has been perceived to be difficult given the divergence of national criminal law systems and traditions (Monar 2013: 3) . The development of judicial cooperation has also been facilitated by the establishment of the European Judicial Network (EJN), which is a network of national contact points that was established in 1998. The EJN has facilitated direct communication between national authorities at the operational level by fostering direct contacts, disseminating information and supporting bilateral judicial assistance requests (Monar 2013: 3) .
A remarkable example of the progress made in the mutual recognition of judicial decisions is the EAW, which is an arrest warrant valid in all EU Member
States. Once issued, the EAW requires an EU Member State to arrest a criminal suspect and transfer them to the issuing state, so that this person can be put on trial or complete a detention period (Council of the European Union 2002). The EAW, which has been considered by some as the EU's flagship counter-terrorism measure in the past decade (Argomaniz et al 2015: 199) , has reduced the average extradition period of serious crime suspects from more than nine months to 45 days (European Commission 2005). Kaunert (2007: 1-2) has argued that the EAW has significantly changed the system of extradition within EU Member States, changing what was formerly an intergovernmental system based on inter-state relations and extraditions into an inter-judiciary system. This can be viewed as an example of European integration progressing into areas of 'high politics', contrary to what many had expected (Hoffmann 1966) .
In addition to the EAW, which has been widely used since its creation, the principle of mutual recognition has also been applied to other types of judicial decisions, such as orders freezing property or evidence (Monar 2013: 340) . In 2008, it was also decided to establish a European Evidence Warrant (EEW), which is a judicial decision whereby objects, documents and data may be obtained from other EU Member States. Some modest progress has also been made with regard to the harmonisation ('approximation') of national criminal laws following the adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam. This can be seen in the adoption of a range of EU Framework Decisions concerning various types of criminal activities, including Euro counterfeiting, terrorism, drug trafficking, racism and xenophobia, trafficking in human beings, and child pornography. Harmonisation in these areas has been based upon common core definitions of the constituent elements of criminal acts, as well as common minimum and maximum penalties (Monar 2013: 341) .
EU police and judicial cooperation has been significantly fostered by two European agencies, namely the European Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, that is, Europol, which was previously known as the European Police Office, and the EU's Judicial Cooperation Unit (Eurojust) . As these agencies have come to play a pivotal role in European police and judicial cooperation, the remainder of this chapter focuses on their activities in order to examine the development of European integration in these interconnected policy areas.
Europol
The EU's law enforcement agency, Europol, mainly aims to improve effectiveness and cooperation among the competent authorities of the EU Member States with regard to preventing and combating terrorism, drug trafficking, and other types of Europol has gained significantly increased powers since the ratification of the Europol Convention. This has been particularly evident in the area of counterterrorism, where Europol saw an expansion of its mandate after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York. It was notably decided to establish a Counter-Terrorist Task Force (CTTF), an operational centre comprising national liaison officers from police and intelligence service and offering 24-hour support for the exchange of information (Rozée et al. 2014) . Following the 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid, the CTTF received a strengthened mandate, which included the collection of all relevant information and intelligence concerning the current terrorist threat in the EU; the analysis of the collected information and the undertaking of operational and strategic analysis; and the formulation of a threat assessment, including targets, modus operandi, and security consequences. These threat assessment reports were amongst the most important outputs of the CTTF and notably included assessments on the financing of terrorism and on terrorist movements in Europe (Rozée et al. 2014 ). In Nevertheless, despite the significant growth in its activities over the last few years, Europol has encountered several obstacles and challenges that have hampered its development and effectiveness (Bures 2008; Rozée et al. 2014) . Firstly, due to a lack of trust, the law enforcement agencies of the Member States have sometimes been reluctant to provide Europol with information or to make use of the support mechanisms that it offers. This reluctance also partly stems from the existence of long-standing informal bilateral or multilateral arrangements amongst some law enforcement agencies in the EU for the purposes of information-sharing and practical coordination, which may be seen as more reliable, more flexible and less bureaucratic than operating through Europol (Bures 2008 ). Another issue is that Europol was formed by top-down political decisions from the EU's political and legislative bodies; police professionals did not create it through a bottom-up process. This may also offer some explanation as to why the law enforcement agencies of the Member States have been at times reluctant to work with Europol and to use Europol mechanisms (Bures 2008) . A final difficulty for Europol has been the lack of supranational powers provided to it under EU treaties (Bures 2008 , Kaunert 2010 .
Finally, it is noteworthy that police cooperation in the EU has also been supported by the activities of another European agency, the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL). This agency, which is now seated in Budapest, supports cooperation and knowledge-sharing among law enforcement officials of the EU Member States and to some extent of third countries on key security issues in the EU. (Labayle and Nilsson 2010: 195-196 ).
The support offered by Eurojust has particularly focused on facilitating the execution of international mutual legal assistance and the implementation of extradition requests. Eurojust deals with the same categories of crimes as Europol, including terrorism, drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings, counterfeiting, money laundering, computer crime, crime against property or public goods including fraud and corruption, criminal offences affecting the European Union's financial interests, environmental crime and participation in a criminal organisation (Eurojust 2016) . However, whereas the development of Europol was not without controversies notably regarding the issue of its accountability, the establishment and the evolution of Eurojust have been rather uncontroversial (Busuioc and Groenleer 2013: 286) .
In addition, Eurojust has grown beyond the purely supportive role for cooperation amongst national prosecution authorities that had been originally foreseen and has acquired a more operational role than Europol (Monar 2013: 343-344 (Weyembergh 2013: 178) . Also, the types of requests that Eurojust can make go beyond merely supporting cooperation (Monar 2013: 343) (Monar 2013: 353; European Parliament 2016) . In addition, the question of how to interpret the idea of establishing the EPPO 'from Eurojust' has been particularly controversial. As outlined by Monar, this can be interpreted in three different ways:
(1) the gradual evolution of Eurojust into the EPPO, which would eventually replace Eurojust, (2) the establishment of the EPPO as a permanent component of Eurojust, or 
